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INPUT SPECIFICITY AND THE PROPAGATION OF
IDIOSYNCRATIC SHOCKS IN PRODUCTION NETWORKS*
Jean-Noe¨l Barrot and Julien Sauvagnat
This article examines whether firm-level idiosyncratic shocks propagate in
production networks. We identify idiosyncratic shocks with the occurrence of
natural disasters. We find that affected suppliers impose substantial output
losses on their customers, especially when they produce specific inputs. These
output losses translate into significant market value losses, and they spill over
to other suppliers. Our point estimates are economically large, suggesting that
input specificity is an important determinant of the propagation of idiosyncratic
shocks in the economy. JEL Codes: L14, E23, E32.
I. Introduction
The origin of business cycle fluctuations is a long-standing
question in economics. Starting with Long and Plosser (1983), a
number of studies have explored whether sectoral linkages may
help explain the aggregation of sector-specific shocks and have
found mixed empirical evidence of the importance of such link-
ages. Relative to the measurement of spillovers across sectors,
spillovers within networks of firms have received little attention
in the empirical literature. The main reason for this is the diffi-
culty of identifying firm-specific shocks. Whether firm-level idio-
syncratic shocks propagate in production networks therefore
remains an open question.
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On one hand, firm-level idiosyncratic shocks should be
quickly absorbed in production networks. Firms plausibly orga-
nize their operations to avoid being affected by temporary disrup-
tion to their supplies. Even when they face such disruptions, they
should be flexible enough to recompose their production mix or
switch to other suppliers. The gradual decrease in trade tariffs
and transportation costs and the development of online business
should make it even easier for firms to adjust their sourcing. On
the other hand, frictions might prevent firms from quickly
making adjustments in the event of supply disruptions. If firms
face switching costs whenever they need to replace a disrupted
supplier, idiosyncratic shocks might propagate from firm to firm
and gradually be amplified.
This article studies whether firm-level shocks propagate or
whether they are absorbed in production networks. To identify
firm-level idiosyncratic shocks, we consider major natural disas-
ters in the past 30 years in the United States.1 These events have
large short-term effects on the sales growth of affected firms. We
trace the propagation of these shocks in production networks
using supplier-customer links reported by publicly listed U.S.
firms. If disrupted intermediate inputs can be easily substituted,
we should not expect input shocks to propagate significantly.
Yet we find that suppliers hit by a natural disaster impose
significant output losses on their customers. When one of their
suppliers is hit by a major natural disaster, firms experience an
average drop by 2 to 3 percentage points in sales growth following
the event. Given that suppliers represent a small share of firms’
total intermediate inputs in our sample, these estimates are
strikingly large. We show that these estimates are robust to con-
trolling for the location of firms’ establishments. In addition, we
do not find any evidence of propagation from suppliers to cus-
tomers when they are not in an active relationship, which sug-
gests that these estimates are not driven by common demand
shocks triggered by natural disasters. In robustness tests, we
show that the estimates are similar when we control for hetero-
geneous trends across firms with many or few suppliers, when we
1. Natural disasters have already been used in prior work to instrument for
school displacement (Imberman, Kugler, and Sacerdote 2012), positive local
demand shocks (Bernile, Korniotis, and Kumar 2013), temporary shocks to local
labor markets (Belasen and Polachek 2008), changes in uncertainty (Baker and
Bloom 2013), and changes in risk perception (Dessaint and Matray 2013).
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weight regression by size, when we restrict the sample to
eventually treated firms only, and whether we include local
supplier-customer relationships in the sample. Given that we
are interested in the propagation of firm-specific shocks, we also
check that we are not picking up sector-level or even macroeco-
nomic shocks. Instead, we find that the effect is not driven by
events that affect many suppliers at the same time or a large
share of the same industry.
We investigate whether the drop in firms’ sales caused by
supply disruptions translates into value losses. If input disrup-
tions simply cause a delay in sales, they would have little effect on
firms’ cash flows and ultimately on firm value. We do not observe
any sort of overshooting in sales, on average, following disasters,
suggesting that these sales are lost indeed. We also conduct event
studies and estimate firms’ cumulative abnormal returns around
disaster events affecting one of their suppliers. We find that input
disruptions cause a 1% drop in firms’ equity value.
We show that input specificity is a key driver of the propa-
gation of firm-level shocks. To do so, we construct three measures
of suppliers’ specificity. The first one borrows from the Rauch
(1999) classification of goods traded on international markets.
Second, we use suppliers’ R&D expenses to capture the impor-
tance of relationship-specific investments. Finally, we use the
number of patents issued by suppliers to capture restrictions on
alternative sources of substitutable inputs. We also check that
the intensity of shocks affecting suppliers or the supplier’s rela-
tive size do not systematically vary with our measures of input
specificity in a manner that could drive the results. We find that
the propagation of input shocks varies strongly with our mea-
sures of specificity. Firms’ sales growth and stock prices signifi-
cantly drop only when a major disaster hits one of their specific
suppliers.
We also ask whether the shock originating from one supplier
propagates horizontally to other suppliers of the same firm that
were not directly affected by the natural disaster. Even though
firms reduce output when one of their suppliers is hit, they could
keep buying from other suppliers and even start buying more.
Even if the customer reduces purchases from all its suppliers
following the disruption of one of its inputs, other suppliers
might be able to find alternative buyers for their production.
Instead, we find large negative spillovers of the initial shock to
other suppliers. The effect is only observed when the disaster hits
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a specific supplier. We show that our estimates are robust to con-
trolling for the location of suppliers’ establishments. Moreover,
we do not find evidence of horizontal propagation when the eco-
nomic link between firms is inactive, which confirms that our
estimates are not driven by common demand shocks.
A potential concern with our analysis is the selected nature of
our network structure. We obtain firms’ network relationships
from the obligation that publicly listed U.S. firms have under reg-
ulation Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No.
131 to report selected information about operating segments in
interim financial reports issued to shareholders, including the
identity of any customer representing more than 10% of total re-
ported sales. Hence, our sample comprises only suppliers with
major customers and only publicly listed firms, which might bias
our estimates. To ensure that our results are not driven by this
selection issue, we run similar analysis using an alternative net-
work structure and confirm that our results are not sensitive to the
restriction of the sample to publicly listed firms.
To check whether our estimates fall within a reasonable range,
we present a general equilibrium network model based on Long and
Plosser (1983) and Acemoglu et al. (2012), and find that our reduced-
form estimates are consistent with the model predictions for high
levels of complementarity across intermediate input suppliers. We
finally assess the economic importance of the propagation channel by
computing the aggregate dollar value of sales lost for suppliers and
customers in our sample, after suppliers are hit by natural disasters.
We find that $1 of lost sales at the supplier level leads to $2.40 of lost
sales at the customer level, which indicates that relationships in
production networks substantially amplify idiosyncratic shocks.
Overall, our findings highlight that the specificity of inter-
mediate inputs allows idiosyncratic shocks to propagate in pro-
duction networks. They echo numerous press reports indicating
that natural disasters have important disruptive effects that
propagate along the supply chain.2 They also highlight the pres-
ence of strong interdependencies in production networks, which
2. See, for instance, ‘‘Hurricane Isaac: Lessons For The Global Supply Chain’’
(Forbes, August 31, 2012) (Available at: http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/
2012/08/31/hurricane-isaac-lessons-for-the-global-supply-chain/#431fd68b2515)
and ‘‘A Storm-Battered Supply Chain Threatens Holiday Shopping’’ (New York
Times, April 11, 2012) (Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/05/business/
a-storm-battered-supply-chain-threatens-the-holiday-shopping-season.html?_r¼0).
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are highly relevant to assess the implications of corporate
bailouts.3
This article contributes to several strands of the literature. It
relates to a growing body of work assessing whether significant
aggregate fluctuations may originate from microeconomic shocks.
This view has long been discarded on the basis that these shocks
would average out and thus would have negligible aggregate ef-
fects (Lucas 1977). Two streams of papers challenge this intui-
tion: the first is based on the idea that large firms contribute
disproportionately to total output (Gabaix 2011; Carvalho and
Gabaix 2013); the second stream posits that shocks are transmit-
ted in the economy through industry linkages (Long and Plosser
1987; Jovanovic 1987; Durlauf 1993; Bak et al. 1993; Horvath
1998, 2000; Conley and Dupor 2003; Di Giovanni and
Levchenko 2010; Carvalho 2010; Caselli et al. 2011; Acemoglu
et al. 2012; Bigio and La’O 2013; Caliendo et al. 2014; Baqaee
2015). However, the empirical evidence on the importance of
sector linkages for the aggregation of sector-specific shocks is
mixed and depends on the level of aggregation (Horvath 2000),
the way linkages are modeled (Foerster, Sarte, and Watson 2011),
and the specification of the production function (Jones 2011;
Atalay 2013). Whereas earlier work has focused on the linkages
across sectors,4 we carefully estimate linkages within networks of
firms.5 In contemporaneous work, Todo, Nakajima, and Matous
(2014), Carvalho, Nirei, and Saito (2014), and Boehm, Flaaen,
and Pandalai-Nayar (2015) study the supply-chain effects of the
Japanese earthquake of 2011. Our setting, which encompasses
multiple natural disasters over a period of 30 years, allows us
to disentangle input disruptions from common demand shocks
and cleanly identify the importance of input specificity for the
propagation and amplification of idiosyncratic shocks. We add
to this literature by documenting that in addition to propagating
3. In testimony to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs on December 4, 2008, Ford CEO Alan Mulally said: ‘‘The collapse of one or
both of our domestic competitors would threaten Ford because we have 80 percent
overlap in supplier networks and nearly 25 percent of Ford’s top dealers also own
GM and Chrysler franchises.’’
4. Di Giovanni, Levchenko, and Mejean (2014) is a recent exception.
5. While this article takes the network structure as given, Chaney (2014),
Oberfield (2013), and Carvalho and Voigtla¨nder (2014), among others, explicitly
model the formation of business networks.
INPUT SPECIFICITY AND IDIOSYNCRATIC SHOCKS 5
 at U
niversita Com
m
erciale Luigi Bocconi on Septem
ber 20, 2016
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
to downstream firms, idiosyncratic shocks also propagate hori-
zontally into supplier networks.6
Furthermore, we build on earlier work that considers the
importance of switching costs for the propagation of firm-level
shocks. A number of studies have analyzed the role of switching
costs in banking relationships for the diffusion of financial shocks
(Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek 1993; Hubbard, Kuttner, and
Palia 2002; Khwaja and Mian 2008; Fernando, May, and
Megginson 2012). Amiti and Weinstein (2013) and Chodorow-
Reich (2014) find that such frictions can explain a large share of
the aggregate drop in investment and employment in the recent
financial crisis. We show that switching costs between trade part-
ners are substantial and can explain the propagation of shocks in
networks of nonfinancial firms. The existence of costs of searching
for suppliers is a key parameter in recent studies of firms’ sourc-
ing decisions (Antra`s, Fort, and Tintelnot 2014; Bernard,
Moxnes, and Saito 2014). Our findings suggest that these costs
can be large in the short run.
We add to a growing body of work in financial economics that
studies how firms are affected by their environment, in particular
by their customers and suppliers. Recent studies have found ev-
idence of comovement in stock returns within production net-
works (Cohen and Frazzini 2008; Hertzel et al. 2008; Menzly
and Ozbas 2010; Ahern 2012; Boone and Ivanov 2012; Kelly,
Lustig, and Van Nieuwerburgh 2013). Our results, which empha-
size the importance of input complementarity and switching
costs, provide a foundation for this comovement. In addition,
our results relate to prior studies of the implications of product
market relationships for firms’ corporate policies (Titman 1984;
Titman and Wessels 1988; MacKay and Phillips 2005; Kale and
Shahrur 2007; Campello and Fluck 2007; Banerjee, Dasgupta,
and Kim 2008; Chu 2012; Moon and Phillips 2014; Ahern and
Harford 2014). A key result of this literature is that firms
whose suppliers need to make relationship-specific investments
hold less leverage to avoid imposing high liquidation costs on
them. Our results suggest that an alternative reason firms
linked to specific suppliers hold less leverage is to avoid the risk
of financial distress brought about by input disruptions.
6. The finding that shocks propagate horizontally is related to Kee (2015), who
documents that domestic firms can benefit from the entry of foreign rivals through
the enhanced productivity of their shared domestic suppliers.
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS6
 at U
niversita Com
m
erciale Luigi Bocconi on Septem
ber 20, 2016
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section
II presents our empirical strategy. Section III presents the data.
Section IV describes the results, and Section V concludes.
II. Identification Strategy
The main source of identification in this article is the occur-
rence of major natural disasters. We identify disruptions to sup-
pliers’ output in a given quarter with the event that a natural
disaster hits the county where their headquarters is located. Of
course, firms’ plants and establishments are not always located in
the same county as their headquarters. This measurement error
is likely to bias the estimates against finding any effect of natural
disasters on firms’ output. In addition, using establishment-level
data from Infogroup,7 we find that in our sample of suppliers, the
average (median) firm has 60% (67%) of its employees located at
its headquarters (see Table II later).
There are many different but unobservable reasons disasters
might affect firms’ output. It might be that they trigger power
outages, disrupting production.8 Perhaps assets including build-
ings, machines, or inventories are damaged. Finally, firms’ work-
force or management might be prevented from reaching the
workplace. Although we have no way to pin down the exact chan-
nel through which disasters disrupt production, we confirm in
Section IV that such disasters have a temporary and significant
negative effect on these suppliers’ sales growth.9
The main focus of the article is not the disruption to the sup-
plying firm itself but the impact on the firm’s customers and on
the customers’ other suppliers. Our identification strategy closely
approximates the following example. Assume that firm S1 is a
supplier to firm C, who also purchases input from firm S2.
Suppose, however, that S1 and S2 do not have any economic
links other than their relationship with C. We first analyze the
response of C when S1 is hit by a natural disaster. We then focus
7. We describe the data in more detail in Section III.
8. Hines, Apt, and Talukdar (2008) find that 44% of major power outages in the
United States are weather-related (i.e., caused by tornado, hurricane/tropical
storm, ice storm, lightning, wind/rain, or other cold weather).
9. Following standard event methodology, we also find that firms experience a
significant stock price decline following the date of a major disaster hitting the
county location of their headquarters.
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on the response of S2. In each case, we contrast these effects with
characteristics that capture the cost of replacing S1 with another
provider of the same input.
To capture supplier-customer links, we rely on the obligation
that publicly listed firms have in the United States to report any
customer accounting for more than 10% of their sales.10 We con-
sider that S1 is a supplier to C in all years ranging from the first
to the last year when S1 reports C as one of its customers. We
then estimate the effect of the shock to S1 on C’s sales growth in a
difference-in-differences framework at the firm level, where the
treatment amounts to having at least one supplier hit by a natu-
ral disaster.
We run the following OLS regression at the firm-quarter
level in our sample of customers,11
Salesi;t4;t ¼ 0 þ 1:HitsOneSupplieri;t4
þ 2:DisasterHitsFirmi;t4 þ i þ t þ i;t;ð1Þ
where Salesi;t4;t is the sales growth between the current
quarter and the same quarter in the previous year. HitsOne
Supplieri;t4 is a dummy taking the value of 1 if at least one
of the firm’s suppliers is located in a county hit by a natural
disaster in the same quarter in the previous year. DisasterHits
Firmi;t4 is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is directly hit by a
natural disaster in the same quarter in the previous year. i
and t are year-quarter and firm fixed effects. All regressions
control for fiscal quarter fixed effects and for the number of
suppliers, with dummies indicating terciles of the number of
suppliers three years prior to date t. In some specifications,
we include stateyear fixed effects and industryyear fixed ef-
fects. We introduce lagged controls for size, age, and profitabil-
ity interacted with year-quarter fixed effects.12 We build these
controls by interacting year-quarter dummies with terciles of
firms’ assets, age, and return on assets three years prior to
10. We describe the data in more detail in Section III.
11. The benefit of using sales is that it is available at the quarterly level for all
publicly listed U.S. firms, which is the ideal frequency to study the temporary dis-
ruptions caused by natural disasters. The drawback is that sales reflect prices and
quantities. However, in Section IV we show that similar results are obtained at the
sector level using a quarterly index of industrial output.
12. Including these controls ensures that the estimates are not driven by het-
erogeneous trends among large, old, or profitable firms.
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS8
 at U
niversita Com
m
erciale Luigi Bocconi on Septem
ber 20, 2016
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
date t. In all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the
firm level to account for serial correlation of the error term
within firms. The coefficient of interest is 1, which measures
the effect on the firm’s sales growth of a disruption to at least
one of its suppliers.
For our strategy to consistently estimate the effect of the
shock to S1 on C, we need to make several identifying assump-
tions. First, C’s sales growth would have been flat in the absence
of treatment (parallel trends assumption). We check whether we
find any effect in the quarter prior to the natural disaster, and we
formally test whether eventually treated and never treated firms
experience diverging trends over the sample period.
Second, the natural disaster should affect C only through its
disruptive effect on S1 (exclusion restriction). However, this as-
sumption might be violated if C’s own production facilities are
affected by the disaster. We handle this problem by excluding
from the sample any supplier-customer relationships where
both parties’ headquarters are located within 300 miles of each
other.13 In addition, we add a dummy in the regression that cap-
tures whether the headquarter county location of C is hit by a
natural disaster. Finally, we use establishment-level data to con-
trol for the fact that plants of C might be directly hit by disasters
affecting S1. The exclusion restriction might otherwise be vio-
lated if C’s demand is affected by the disaster hitting one of its
suppliers, for instance, because its customer base is located close
to its supplier base. If this were the case, disasters hitting the
supplier’s location would presumably affect the customer irre-
spective of whether their economic link was active. To address
this concern, we use the unique feature of our data relative to
other studies of production networks, namely, that we observe
the time series of relationships. By means of illustration, we pre-
sent in Figure I the evolution of the supplier-customer network
from 1995 to 2000 (please see the online edition of this article to
view the figure in color). Relationships that were active in 1995
but not in 2000 are depicted in red. Relationships that are active
in both years are depicted in green. Relationships that were not
active in 1995 but were active in 2000 are depicted in blue. It is
clear from this figure that a substantial share of relationships
13. We show in Table A.7 in the Online Appendix that the estimates are insen-
sitive to this cutoff.
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start or end within this five-year window. This allows us to check
whether we only observe an effect of disruptions to S1 on C’s
output when the link between S1 and C is active.
One might also worry that firms endogenously select their
location—and the location of their suppliers—by taking into ac-
count the fact that natural disasters will disrupt their production.
This is not a threat to the identification strategy: if anything, this
should bias the results against finding any propagation effects.
However, it might affect the external validity of these estimates,
a point that we discuss in Section IV.E.
FIGURE I
Network Evolution from 1995 to 2000
This figure illustrates the evolution of the supplier-customer network from
1995 to 2000. Relationships that were active in 1995 but not in 2000 are de-
picted in light gray. Relationships that are active in both years are depicted in
dark gray. Relationships that were not active in 1995 but were active in 2000
are depicted in black. (Please see the online edition of this article to view the
figure in color.)
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We would expect to find an effect only when the firm faces
relatively large costs of searching for and switching to alternative
suppliers of the same input. Otherwise, following the disruption
of the supplier of a given intermediate input, the firm would turn
to other providers of the same input and maintain its first-best
level of output. We thus contrast the effects with the extent to
which the customer can switch to other suppliers of a given input.
We hypothesize that suppliers are more likely to produce specific
inputs if they operate in industries producing differentiated
goods, if they have a high level of R&D, or if they hold patents.
Using these three different proxies to measure the specificity of
any given supplier, we split the main variable of interest in equa-
tion (1), Disaster Hits One Supplier, into two dummy variables,
Disaster hits one specific supplier and Disaster hits one
nonspecific supplier, indicating respectively whether at least
one specific and nonspecific supplier of the firm is hit by a natural
disaster.
Finally, we study the effect of the initial shock on S1 on any
other supplier S2 of C. To do so, we run an OLS regression in our
sample of suppliers, at the firm-quarter level, of sales growth be-
tween the current quarter and the same quarter in the previous
year on Disaster hits firm, a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is di-
rectly hit by a natural disaster; Disaster hits one customer, a
dummy equal to 1 if (at least) one customer of the firm is hit by
a natural disaster; and Disaster hits one customer’s supplier, the
main variable of interest, a dummy taking the value of 1 if (at
least) one other supplier of the firm’s customer(s) is hit by a nat-
ural disaster. In all specifications, we control for fiscal quarter
fixed effects and for the number of customers’ suppliers, with
dummies indicating terciles of the number of customers’
suppliers.14
14. This test rests on the same assumptions needed to identify the effect of the
natural disaster on C. In particular, it needs to be the case that the natural disaster
should affect S2 only through its disruptive effect on S1 and its indirect effect on C.
The exclusion restriction might be violated if S2’s production facilities are affected
by the disaster hitting S1. We drop from the sample any relationship where S2 is
located within 300 miles of either S1 or C. In addition, we use establishment-level
data to control for the fact that plants of S2 might be directly affected by disasters.
The exclusion restriction might alternatively be violated if S2’s demand is affected
by the disaster hitting S1, for instance, because its customer base is located close to
S1. If this were the case, disasters hitting S1 would presumably affect S2 irrespec-
tive of whether they were linked through their relationship with C. We address this
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III. Data
III.A. Firm-Level Information
Financial data and information about firms’ headquarter lo-
cation are retrieved from Compustat North America
Fundamentals Quarterly database. We restrict our sample to
nonfinancial firms whose headquarters are located in the
United States over the 1978–2013 period.15 We restrict the
sample to firms reporting in calendar quarters. All continuous
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their
distributions. We adjust our computation of the growth in sales
and cost of goods sold for inflation using the GDP deflator of the
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
As already mentioned, we use the county location of head-
quarters to identify whether a firm is hit by a natural disaster.
We make an important adjustment to the (county and state) lo-
cation of the headquarters of the firms in our sample. Compustat
only records the last available location of the headquarters of
each firm. We update the county and state of each firm in our
sample using information gathered by Infogroup, which goes
back as far as 1997.16 In addition, we use employment and estab-
lishment information from Infogroup to construct controls for
whether more than 10% of employees of a firm across all estab-
lishments are hit by a natural disaster.17 Finally, we construct
the 48 Fama-French industry dummies from the conversion table
in the appendix of Fama and French (1997) using the firm’s four-
digit SIC industry code.
We also examine the effect of input disruptions on stock
prices. For this, we obtain data on daily stock prices from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP daily file). We
focus on ordinary shares of stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ.
concern by checking that disasters hitting S1 only affect S2 when the economic link
between S1 and C is active, and when the economic link between S2 and C is active.
15. Customer-supplier links detailed below are available only from 1978; 2013
is the last year for which data on major natural disasters are available.
16. This leads to a nonnegligible adjustment. Between 1997 and 2013, firms’
headquarter county location is corrected for 13% (15%) of observations in our
sample of customers (suppliers). For years before 1997, we update the county and
state location of firms using the nearest available year in Infogroup.
17. Infogroup makes phone calls to establishments to gather, among other data
items, the number of full-time equivalent employees.
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III.B. Supplier-Customer Links
Crucial to our analysis is the identification of relationships
between suppliers and their customers. Fortunately, regulation
SFAS No. 131 requires firms to report selected information about
operating segments in interim financial reports issued to share-
holders. In particular, firms are required to disclose certain finan-
cial information for any industry segment that makes up more
than 10% of consolidated yearly sales, assets, or profits as well as
the identity of any customer representing more than 10% of the
total reported sales.18
We take advantage of this requirement to obtain information
on supplier-customer links. For each firm filing with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), we obtain the
name of its principal customers and associated sales from
the Compustat Segment files from 1978 to 2013.19 Given that
we are mainly interested in publicly listed customers for which
accounting data are available, we associate each name to a
Compustat identifier by hand. More specifically, we use a pho-
netic string-matching algorithm to match each customer name
with the five closest names from the set of firms filing with the
SEC and all their subsidiaries. We then select the best match by
hand by inspecting the firm and customers’ names and indus-
tries. Customers with no match are excluded from the sample.
Customers in our data set represent approximately 75% of
the total sales in Compustat over the sample period, which makes
us confident that the sample is representative of the U.S. econ-
omy. There are limitations associated with these data. In partic-
ular, we generally do not observe suppliers whose sales to the
customer are lower than 10% of their revenues.20 We discuss
this selection issue in Section IV.E and show that our estimates
hold when we consider alternative network structures that are
not subject to this selection issue in Section A.3 of the Online
Appendix.
18. Although the data set also includes the variable that captures the annual
sales of the reporting supplier to the reported customer, this information is pro-
vided on a voluntary basis and often imputed.
19. Other papers have used the customer-supplier data, including Fee and
Thomas (2004) and Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006), who analyze, respectively,
the effect of mergers and corporate equity ownership on the value of suppliers.
20. Some firms voluntarily report the names of other major customers when
sales are below this threshold.
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III.C. Natural Disasters
We obtain information on each major natural disaster hitting
the U.S. territory from the SHELDUS (Spatial Hazard and Loss
Database for the United States) database maintained by the
University of South Carolina. For each event, the database pro-
vides information on the start date, the end date, and the Federal
Information Processing Standards (FIPS) code of all affected
counties. We restrict the list to events classified as major disas-
ters that occurred after 1978, which is when supplier-customer
data become available. We also restrict the sample to disasters
lasting less than 30 days with total estimated damages above $1
billion 2013 constant dollars. As evidenced in Table I, we are left
with 41 major disasters of all kinds, including blizzards, earth-
quakes, floods, and hurricanes. These disasters affect a broad
range of U.S. states and counties over the sample period.
However, they are generally very localized and affect at most
22% of U.S. employment.21 Figure II shows the frequency of oc-
currence of major natural disasters over the sample period for
each U.S. county. Some counties are more frequently hit than
others, especially those located along the southeast coast of the
U.S. mainland. In comparison, as evidenced in Figure III, the
location of suppliers in the sample spans the entire U.S. main-
land, including counties that are never and counties that are
often hit by natural disasters.
III.D. Input Specificity
We rely on three different proxies to measure the specificity
of any given supplier. We first borrow from Rauch (1999), who
classifies inputs into differentiated or homogeneous depending on
whether they are sold on an organized exchange. This classifica-
tion groups inputs into 1,189 industries classified according to the
four-digit SITC Rev. 2 system. Each industry is coded as being
either sold on an exchange, reference priced, or homogeneous. We
use the bridge between the SITC and SIC classification used in
Feenstra (1996) to compute the share of differentiated goods pro-
duced in each industry. A supplier is thus considered specific if it
operates in an industry that lies above the median along this
21. Most of the events affect less than 10% of U.S. employment, which provides
us with an ideal setting to cleanly identify input disruptions from general equilib-
rium effects. We further check that the estimates are similar for relatively small
and relatively large natural disasters (see Online Appendix Table A.5).
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4 or more
3
2
1
Never Hit
FIGURE II
Major Natural Disaster Frequency by U.S. Counties
This map presents the number of major natural disaster strikes for each
county in the U.S. mainland over the sample period. The list of counties af-
fected by each major natural disaster is obtained from the SHELDUS database
at the University of South Carolina. Table I describes the major natural disas-
ters included in the sample.
101 to 350
11 to 100
2 to 10
1
0
FIGURE III
Location of Sample Suppliers’ Headquarters
This map presents for our sample the number of suppliers’ headquarters
located in each U.S. county. Data on the location of headquarters are obtained
from Compustat and Infogroup databases.
INPUT SPECIFICITY AND IDIOSYNCRATIC SHOCKS 17
 at U
niversita Com
m
erciale Luigi Bocconi on Septem
ber 20, 2016
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
dimension. We also proxy for the level of specificity with the ratio
of R&D to sales, and we classify suppliers as specific if this ratio
lies above the sample median in the two years prior to any given
quarter. Finally, suppliers holding patents are more likely to pro-
duce inputs that cannot be easily replaced by other suppliers.
Hence, in each quarter, we also sort firms based on the number
of patents they issued in the three previous years and consider as
specific those lying above the sample median. To do so, we re-
trieve patent information from Google patents assembled by
Kogan et al. (2012).22
III.E. Summary Statistics
Table II presents summary statistics for our sample. Panel A
presents the customer sample, which consists of 80,574 firm-
quarters between 1978 and 2013. There are 2,051 firms in this
sample. A firm is included in the sample in each quarter between
three years before and three years after it appears as a customer
in the Compustat Segment files. On average, a firm is reported by
1.38 suppliers in a given year. The main variables of interest are
the growth in sales and cost of goods sold over the previous four
quarters. The sample averages for these variables are 10.2% and
10.6%, and their medians are 4.0% and 3.8%. The probability that
(at least) one of the suppliers of a given firm is hit by a natural
disaster in any quarter is 1.4%. This compares with the probabil-
ity of 1.6% that the customer is directly hit by a natural disaster.
There are, on average, seven years between the first and the
last year a supplier reports a firm as a customer. The average
sales of suppliers to their customers (identified with variable
SALECS in the Compustat Segment files) represents around
2.5% of firms’ cost of goods sold. Given that wages and associated
costs represent a large share of cost of goods sold, this is probably
an underestimate of the importance of these suppliers in cus-
tomers inputs. However, this suggests that suppliers are small
with respect to customers. There is no significant difference in the
share that specific and nonspecific suppliers represent in firms’
cost of goods sold across our three measures of input specificity.
Finally, suppliers are located, on average, a little over 1,250 miles
away from their customers, irrespective of whether they are
specific.
22. We thank the authors for making the data available to us.
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TABLE II
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. p1 p50 p99
Panel A: Customer sample
Sales growth (t  4,t) 80,574 0.102 0.375 0.606 0.040 1.927
Cogs growth (t  4,t) 79358 0.106 0.411 0.651 0.038 2.193
Disaster hits firm (t) 80,574 0.016 0.126 0.000 0.000 1.000
Disaster hits one
supplier (t)
80,574 0.014 0.118 0.000 0.000 1.000
Number of suppliers 80,574 1.383 4.162 0.000 0.000 19.000
Diff. R&D Patent
S NS S NS S NS
Av. duration of
relationships
7.125 6.692 6.373 8.335 7.821 6.618
Av. supplier-customer
HQs distance
1,332 1,210 1,502 1,214 1,388 1,219
Av. suppliers’ input share 0.022 0.025 0.017 0.023 0.025 0.022
Eventually treated Never treated
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Obs. Mean Std. dev.
Assets 32,061 12,656 20,013 48,513 3,254 7,099
Age 32,061 27.822 16.623 48,513 19.233 15.680
ROA 32,061 0.145 0.091 48,513 0.118 0.128
Panel B: Supplier sample
Obs. Mean Std. dev. p1 p50 p99
Sales growth (t  4,t) 139,976 0.188 0.814 -0.876 0.045 4.568
Disaster hits firm (t) 139,976 0.017 0.127 0.000 0.000 1.000
Disaster hits a customer (t) 139,976 0.008 0.088 0.000 0.000 0.000
Disaster hits a customer’s
supplier (t)
139,976 0.042 0.200 0.000 0.000 1.000
Number of customers 139,976 0.711 0.964 0.000 0.000 4.000
% Employees at HQs
county
102,279 0.597 0.365 0.000 0.667 1.000
Notes. This table presents the summary statistics for our sample. Panel A presents the customer sample,
which consists of 80,574 firm-quarters between 1978 and 2013. There are 2,051 firms in this sample. A firm
is included in the customer sample for each quarter between three years before the first year and three years
after the last year it appears as a customer in the Compustat Segment files. The main variables of interest
are the growth in sales and cost of goods sold relative to the same quarter in the previous year. Panel A also
reports for customer firms the average duration of relationships with their suppliers (computed as the
number of years between the first and last year the supplier reports the firm as a customer in the
Compustat Segment files), the average distance in miles (computed using the Haversine formula) between
the headquarters (HQs) county of the firm and the headquarters county of its suppliers, and the average
suppliers’ input share (measured as the ratio of the suppliers’ sales of the supplier to the firm over the firm’s
cost of goods sold) separately for relationships with specific (S) and nonspecific (NS) suppliers. In columns (1)
and (2), a supplier is considered as specific if its industry lies above the median of the share of differentiated
goods according to the classification provided by Rauch (1999). In columns (3) and (4), a firm is considered
specific if its ratio of R&D expenses over sales is above the median in the two years prior to any given
quarter. In columns (5) and (6), a firm is considered as specific if the number of patents it issued in the past
three years is above the median. The last part of Panel A compares the size, age, and return on assets (ROA)
of eventually treated firms, namely, those with suppliers that are hit by a major natural disaster at least
once over the sample period, and never treated firms. Panel B presents the supplier sample, which consists of
139,976 firm-quarters between 1978 and 2013. There are 4,686 firms in this sample. A firm is included in the
supplier sample for each quarter between three years before the first year and three years after the last year
it reports another firm as a customer in the Compustat Segment files. The main variable of interest is the
growth in sales relative to the same quarter in the previous year.
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The last part of Panel A compares the size, age, and return on
assets of eventually treated and never treated firms.23 Eventually
treated firms—those having one supplier hit by a major disaster
at least once during the sample period—are larger, older, and
slightly more profitable than never treated firms. This makes it
all the more important to ensure in the empirical analysis that
firm-level characteristics are not driving the results.
Panel B presents the supplier sample, which consists of
139,976 firm-quarters between 1978 and 2013. There are 4,686
firms in this sample. A firm is included in the sample in each
quarter between three years before and three years after it reports
another firm as a customer in the Compustat Segment files. These
firms report an average of 0.7 customers. The main variable of
interest is the growth in sales over the previous four quarters.
The sample average for this variable is 18.8%, and the median is
4.5%. The probability that a firm in this sample is hit by a natural
disaster in any quarter is 1.7%. The probability that one of a firm’s
customers is hit in any given quarter is 0.8%. Finally, the proba-
bility that one of its customers’ suppliers is hit is 4.2%.
We investigate the distribution of suppliers and customers rel-
ative to the entire Compustat universe in Table A.12 of the Online
Appendix. In Panel A, we present the number and share of quarter-
firm per 48 Fama-French industries for suppliers, customers, and
the Compustat universe. We do not find very large deviations across
the three samples. This makes us confident that our sample is fairly
representative of the Compustat universe. In Panel B, we further
split the supplier and customer samples depending, respectively, on
whether suppliers are hit and whether customers are treated in a
given quarter. Again, we do not find any patterns indicating that
our estimates might be driven by any specific industry.
IV. Results
IV.A. Effect on Affected Suppliers
We first explore the extent to which suppliers’ production is
affected when the county where their headquarters are located is
23. Size is defined as total assets (Compustat item AT). Age is defined as the
number of years since incorporation; when the date of incorporation is missing, age
is defined as the number of years since the firm has been in the Compustat database.
Return on assets (ROA) is operating income before depreciation and amortization
(item OIBDP) divided by total assets.
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hit by a natural disaster.24 As already discussed, we have no way
to formally pin down the channel through which natural disas-
ters translate into disruptions to suppliers’ production functions.
Instead, we consider their effect on firms’ sales.
In our sample of suppliers, we regress firms’ sales growth (rel-
ative to the same quarter in the previous year) on a series of dum-
mies indicating whether a major natural disaster hits the firm in
each of the current and previous five quarters, as well as fiscal quar-
ter, year-quarter, and firm fixed effects. The results are presented in
Table III. In the first column, the coefficient on the dummies indi-
cating that a disaster hits the firm in the previous three quarters are
negative and significant, ranging from 3.3 to 4.5 percentage points,
which indicates that suppliers’ sales growth drops significantly for
three consecutive quarters following a disaster. We introduce con-
trols for size, age, and profitability interacted with year-quarter
fixed effects in the second column. The coefficient range does not
change, which suggests that differences in the types of firms that
are hit do not drive the patterns in sales growth. In the third and
fourth columns we introduce stateyear fixed effects and indus-
tryyear fixed effects. The effect goes down slightly in magnitude
but remains significant in quarter (t  1). Taken together, the re-
sults suggest that relative to firms in the same state or the same
industry, firms with headquarters located in a county directly af-
fected by the natural disaster seem to do worse.
One purpose of the following section is to assess whether sup-
pliers’ specificity is a driver of the propagation of firm-level shocks.
However, if shocks to specific suppliers were, on average, larger
than shocks to nonspecific suppliers, this would lead us to mechan-
ically overestimate the effect of input specificity on the propaga-
tion of shocks. We check in Table IV that the disruption caused by
natural disasters is not larger for specific than for nonspecific sup-
pliers. To do so, we consider the sample of suppliers and regress
firms’ sales growth on a dummy indicating whether the firm is hit
by a disaster (in the previous four quarters), a dummy taking the
value of 1 if the firm is specific, and the interaction between the
24. It is important to note that the effect of a natural disaster on production
could a priori go either way, since the destruction triggered by disasters sometimes
generates a local increase in demand (Bernile, Korniotis, and Kumar 2013).
Anecdotal evidence indeed suggests that providers of basic supplies experience
boosts in sales in the period around the disaster (see, for instance, Bloomberg,
August 26, 2011, ‘‘Home Depot, Lowe’s stocks get hurricane boost.’’) (Available
at: http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/26/markets/tweets_stocktwits/).
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two. We run the same regression for our three measures of input
specificity. The coefficient on the interaction term is always posi-
tive, although not statistically significant, which suggests that
shocks to specific suppliers are, if anything, of smaller magnitude
than shocks to nonspecific suppliers.25
IV.B. Downstream Propagation: Effect on Customers’ Sales
In this section, we estimate the effect on firms’ sales of shocks
affecting their suppliers. We first illustrate the results in Figure IV,
TABLE III
NATURAL DISASTER DISRUPTIONS—SUPPLIER SALES GROWTH
Sales Growth (t – 4,t)
Disaster hits firm (t) 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.011
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Disaster hits firm (t  1) 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.032* 0.039**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
Disaster hits firm (t  2) 0.033* 0.032* 0.024 0.026
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021)
Disaster hits firm (t  3) 0.042** 0.040** 0.032 0.029
(0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023)
Disaster hits firm (t  4) 0.031 0.028 0.029 0.024
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023)
Disaster hits firm (t  5) 0.007 0.005 0.022 0.019
(0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size, age, ROA 
year-quarter FE
No Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE No No Yes Yes
Industry-year FE No No No Yes
Observations 139,976 139,976 139,976 139,976
R2 0.177 0.192 0.212 0.233
Notes. This table presents estimates from panel regressions of firms’ sales growth relative to the same
quarter in the previous year on a dummy indicated whether the firm is hit by a major disaster in the
current and each of the previous five quarters. All regressions include fiscal quarter, year-quarter, and
firm fixed effects. In the second and fourth columns, we also control for firm-level characteristics (dummies
indicating terciles of size, age, and ROA, respectively) interacted with year-quarter dummies. In the third
and fourthcolumns, we include state dummies interacted with year dummies. In the fourth column, we
include 48 Fama-French industry dummies interacted with year dummies. Standard errors presented in
parentheses are clustered at the firm level. Regressions contain all firm-quarters of our supplier sample
(described in Table II, Panel B) between 1978 and 2013. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
25. The coefficient on Specific firm is omitted in the first and second columns
because firms’ industry classification is fixed over time and therefore absorbed by
firm fixed effects.
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which compares the growth in sales (relative to the same quarter
in the previous year) at different quarters surrounding a major
natural disaster for both directly affected suppliers and their cus-
tomers. The graph highlights that input disruptions translate into
lost sales for the firm a few quarters after the supplier is hit.
1. Baseline Results. We then run the OLS panel regression
detailed in equation (1), and present the results in Table V. In
Panel A, we consider the effect of input disruption on sales
growth. The variable of interest is the dummy Disaster hits one
supplier (t  4), which takes the value of 1 if (at least) one of the
firm’s suppliers is hit by a natural disaster in quarter t  4, and 0
otherwise. The estimates in the first column indicate that sales
growth drops by 3.1 percentage points. Given the sample mean of
10%, the estimate is economically large. In the second column, we
introduce controls for lagged size, age, and profitability, inter-
acted with year-quarter fixed effects. The estimate decreases
TABLE IV
NATURAL DISASTERS DISRUPTIONS—SPECIFIC VERSUS NONSPECIFIC SUPPLIERS
Sales Growth (t – 4,t)
Supplier specificity: Diff. R&D Patent
Disaster hits firm
(t  4,t  1)
0.050*** 0.044*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.046*** 0.041***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015)
Disaster hits specific
firm (t  4,t  1)
0.023 0.013 0.038 0.044 0.020 0.011
(0.026) (0.026) (0.040) (0.039) (0.028) (0.028)
Specific firm 0.099*** 0.090*** 0.060*** 0.030**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.014) (0.013)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size, age, ROA 
year-quarter FE
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 139,976 139,976 139,976 139,976 139,976 139,976
R2 0.177 0.192 0.177 0.192 0.177 0.192
Notes. This table presents estimates from panel regressions of firms’ sales growth relative to the same
quarter in the previous year on a dummy indicated whether the firm is hit by a major disaster in one of
the previous four quarters. In the first and second columns, a firms is considered as specific if its industry
lies above the median of the share of differentiated goods according to the classification provided by Rauch
(1999). In the third and fourth columns, a firm is considered specific if the ratio of its R&D expenses over
sales is above the median in the two years prior to any given quarter. In the fifth and sixth columns, a
firm is considered as specific if the number of patents it issued in the previous three years is above the
median. All regressions include fiscal-quarter, year-quarter, and firm fixed effects. In the second, fourth,
and sixth columns we also control for firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size, age,
and ROA respectively) interacted with year-quarter dummies. Standard errors presented in parentheses
are clustered at the firm level. Regressions contain all firm-quarters of our supplier sample (described in
Table II, Panel B) between 1978 and 2013. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
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slightly to 2.7 percentage points and remains significant. In the
third column, we control for stateyear fixed effects and obtain
similar results. This confirms that the effect of input disruption
on sales is not related to temporary shocks at the state level or to
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FIGURE IV
Natural Disaster Strikes and Sales Growth
This figure presents difference-in-differences estimates of quarterly sales
growth in the year before and the two years after a major natural disaster
for both directly affected suppliers and their customers. Sales growth is the
growth in sales relative to the same quarter in the previous year. The
dashed line connects estimated coefficients,  , of the following regression per-
formed in the supplier sample:
Salesi;t4;t ¼ þ
X9
¼4
:HitsFirmi;t þ i þ t þ i;t:
The solid line connects estimated coefficients, g , of the following regression
performed in the customer sample:
Salesi;t4;t ¼ þ
X9
¼4
:HitsFirmi;t þ
X9
¼4
g:HitsSupplieri;t þ i þ t þ i;t;
where t and i are year-quarter and firm fixed effects, respectively; Hits
Firmi;t is a dummy equal to 1 if a natural disaster hits firm i in year-quarter
t ; and HitsSupplieri;t is a dummy equal to 1 if a natural disaster hits at
least one supplier of firm i in year-quarter t . Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level in both regressions. *, **, and *** denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The sample period spans 1978 to 2013.
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the fact that treated firms might be closer to the disaster zone
than other firms. In the fourth column, we add industryyear
fixed effects. The point estimate is 1.9 percentage points, which
suggests that the effect is not driven by an industry-wide shock.
TABLE V
DOWNSTREAM PROPAGATION—BASELINE
Panel A Sales Growth (t – 4,t)
Disaster hits one
supplier (t  4)
0.031*** 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.019**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Disaster hits firm (t  4) 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.005 0.003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Number of suppliers Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size, age, ROA 
year-quarter FE
No Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE No No Yes Yes
Industry-year FE No No No Yes
Observations 80,574 80,574 80,574 80,574
R2 0.234 0.262 0.300 0.342
Panel B Cost of Goods Sold Growth (t – 4,t)
Disaster hits one
supplier (t  4)
0.031*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.020**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Disaster hits firm (t  4) 0.014 0.013 0.001 0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Number of suppliers Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size, age, ROA 
year-quarter FE
No Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE No No Yes Yes
Industry-year FE No No No Yes
Observations 79,358 79,358 79,358 79,358
R2 0.188 0.215 0.253 0.290
Notes. This table presents estimates from panel regressions of firms’ sales growth (Panel A) or cost of
goods sold growth (Panel B) relative to the same quarter in the previous year on a dummy indicating
whether (at least) one of their suppliers is hit by a major disaster in the same quarter of the previous year.
All regressions include a dummy indicating whether the firm itself is hit by a major disaster in the same
quarter of the previous year as well as fiscal quarter, year-quarter, and firm fixed effects. All regressions
also control for the number of suppliers (dummies indicating terciles of the number of suppliers). In the
second, third, and fourth columns, we control for firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of
size, age, and ROA, respectively) interacted with year-quarter dummies. In the third and fourth columns,
we include state dummies interacted with year dummies. In the fourth column, we include 48 Fama-
French industry dummies interacted with year dummies. Regressions contain all firm-quarters of our
customer sample (described in Table II, Panel A) between 1978 and 2013. Standard errors presented in
parentheses are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
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Across specifications, the coefficient on the dummy Disaster hits
firm (t  4) is negative, which reflects the finding presented in
Table III. Similar results are obtained in Panel B when we
replace the dependent variable with the growth in the cost of
goods sold. Altogether, the results indicate that disruptions to
their suppliers’ production strongly affect firms’ sales growth,
which drops by a little over 25% with respect to the sample
average. Since suppliers in the sample represent approximately
2.5% of firms’ cost of goods sold, these estimates are strikingly
large.
The drop in sales growth should show no prior trends and
should be temporary for the parallel trends assumption to be sat-
isfied. As their suppliers restore their productive capacity, firms’
sales growth should recover. To test whether this is indeed the
case, we analyze the dynamics of the effects. We regress the firm’s
sales growth on dummies indicating whether a major disaster
hits (at least) one of their suppliers in each of the current and
the previous five quarters. The results presented in Table VI in-
dicate that the coefficient in the same quarter of the previous year
(Disaster hits one firm (t  4)) is the largest in absolute value. No
effect on firms’ sales growth is found contemporaneously or prior
to the quarter when the effect of natural disasters is found on
suppliers (which occurs in (t  1), see Table III). This confirms
that the drop in firms’ sales growth is not driven by prior trends
but is indeed caused by the natural disaster affecting one of its
suppliers.
We go a step further to test the validity of the parallel trend
assumption. We check whether eventually treated firms and
never treated firms experience diverging time trends in the ab-
sence of major natural disasters. To do so, we regress firms’ sales
growth on a treatment dummy that equals 1 for firms eventually
treated in our sample interacted with the full set of year-quarter
fixed effects, Ti  dt, and estimate the regression only over pe-
riods for which no major natural disaster has hit the U.S. terri-
tory in the current or previous four quarters. The regression also
includes terciles of the number of suppliers, fiscal quarter fixed
effects, and firm fixed effects. We are mainly interested in the
F-statistics of the joint significance test of all the Ti  dt (see
column (6) of Table A.2). If we fail to reject the null hypothesis
that they all equal 0, this would provide strong support for the
parallel trend assumption. Results are reported in Table A.2 of
the Online Appendix. In all cases, F-tests are small, and we
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TABLE VI
DOWNSTREAM PROPAGATION—SALES GROWTH DYNAMICS
Sales Growth (t – 4,t)
Disaster hits one supplier (t) 0.012 0.010 0.007 0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Disaster hits one supplier
(t  1)
0.013 0.013 0.011 0.004
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Disaster hits one supplier
(t  2)
0.013 0.009 0.010 0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Disaster hits one supplier
(t  3)
0.028*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.013
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Disaster hits one supplier
(t  4)
0.031*** 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.020**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Disaster hits one supplier
(t  5)
0.016* 0.013 0.014 0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Disaster hits firm (t) 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.011
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Disaster hits firm (t  1) 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Disaster hits firm (t  2) 0.023** 0.022** 0.002 0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Disaster hits firm (t  3) 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.022* 0.016
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Disaster hits firm (t  4) 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.010 0.006
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Disaster hits firm (t  5) 0.026** 0.027** 0.010 0.006
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Number of suppliers Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size, age, ROA 
year-quarter FE
No Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE No No Yes Yes
Industry-year FE No No No Yes
Observations 80,574 80,574 80,574 80,574
R2 0.234 0.262 0.300 0.342
Notes. This table presents estimated coefficients from panel regressions of firms’ sales growth relative
to the same quarter in the previous year on dummies indicating whether (at least) one of their suppliers is
hit by a major disaster in the current and each of the previous five quarters. All regressions include
dummies indicating whether the firm itself is hit by a major disaster in the current and each of the
previous five quarters, as well as fiscal-quarter, year-quarter and firm fixed effects. All regressions also
control for the number of suppliers (dummies indicating terciles of the number of suppliers). In the second,
third, and fourth columns, we control for firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size,
age, and ROA, respectively) interacted with year-quarter dummies. In the third and fourth columns, we
include state dummies interacted with year dummies. In the fourth column, we include 48 Fama-French
industry dummies interacted with year dummies. Regressions contain all firm-quarters of our customer
sample (described in Table II, Panel A) between 1978 and 2013. Standard errors presented in parentheses
are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
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always fail to reject at conventional levels the null hypothesis
that all Ti  dt are 0 in the absence of major natural disasters.
This makes us confident that never treated firms provide a good
counterfactual for eventually treated firms in periods of major
natural disasters.
One might be concerned that the results are driven by the
location of customers’ plants close to the headquarters of their
suppliers. In Panel A, Table VII, we introduce a dummy taking
the value of 1 if more than 10% of the customer’s workforce across
all establishments is hit by a natural disaster. If headquarters’
locations are poor proxies for the true location of customers’ es-
tablishments, and if the economic link with the supplier proxies
for the true location of the customer, this variable should absorb
the effect. The results indicate that this is not the case, as the
coefficient on Disaster hits a supplier remains remarkably stable
(compared with Table V) and statistically significant in all
specifications.26
Another concern is that the estimates from Table V might
reflect common demand shocks affecting the firm and its suppli-
ers, for instance, because their customer base is located in the
same area. To handle this issue, we augment our OLS regressions
with a dummy called Disaster hits any eventually linked suppli-
ers’ location, which takes the value of 1 if any headquarters’
county locations of all suppliers once in a relationship with the
firm is hit by a natural disaster. If the effects that we are picking
up in Table V reflect common demand shocks, this variable
should subsume the main variable of interest, Disaster hits one
supplier. This is arguably a very conservative test of our hypoth-
esis, since it is likely that some of the supplier-customer relation-
ships that we observed from the SFAS No. 131 were initiated
earlier (at a time where the customer represented less than
10% of the suppliers’ sales) or maintained later. We present the
results of this specification in Table VII, Panel B. The coefficient
on the additional variable is insignificant, whereas the coefficient
on Disaster hits one supplier remains stable and significant in all
specifications. Hence, input disruptions caused by natural disas-
ters propagate only when there is an active business relationship
between the disrupted supplier and the firm.
26. The results are similar when instead of a 10% threshold, we use a 1%, 2%, or
5% threshold. They are also similar when we restrict the sample to firm-years for
which establishment data are available, from 1997 to 2013.
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TABLE VII
DOWNSTREAM PROPAGATION—ROBUSTNESS
Sales Growth (t  4,t)
Panel A: Controlling for share of the workforce hit
Disaster hits more than 10%
of firm’s workforce (t  4)
0.006 0.005 0.002 0.009
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Disaster hits one supplier
(t  4)
0.031*** 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.020**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Disaster hits firm (t  4) 0.027** 0.026** 0.006 0.009
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Number of suppliers Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size, age, ROA 
year-quarter FE
No Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE No No Yes Yes
Industry-year FE No No No Yes
Observations 80,574 80,574 80,574 80,574
R2 0.234 0.262 0.300 0.342
Panel B: Controlling for whether any ‘‘eventually linked’’ supplier is hit
Disaster hits any eventually
linked suppliers’ location
(t  4)
0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Disaster hits one supplier
(t  4)
0.033*** 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.023**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Disaster hits firm (t  4) 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.005 0.003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Number of suppliers Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size, age, ROA 
year-quarter FE
No Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE No No Yes Yes
Industry-year FE No No No Yes
Observations 80,574 80,574 80,574 80,574
R2 0.234 0.262 0.300 0.342
Notes. This table presents estimates from panel regressions of firms’ sales growth relative to the same
quarter in the previous year on a dummy indicating whether (at least) one supplier is hit by a major
disaster in the same quarter of the previous year. All regressions include a dummy indicating whether the
firm itself is hit by a major disaster in the same quarter in the previous year as well as fiscal quarter,
year-quarter, and firm fixed effects. Panel A also includes a dummy indicating whether 10% or more of the
firm’s workforce is hit. Panel B includes a dummy indicating whether (at least) one location of any sup-
plier once in a relationship with the firm is hit. In the second through fourth columns, we control for firm-
level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size, age, and ROA, respectively) interacted with year-
quarter dummies. In the third and fourth columns, we include state dummies interacted with year
dummies. In the fourth column, we include 48 Fama-French industry dummies interacted with year
dummies. Regressions contain all firm-quarters of our customer sample (described in Table II, Panel A)
between 1978 and 2013. Standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered at the firm-level. *, **,
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
INPUT SPECIFICITY AND IDIOSYNCRATIC SHOCKS 29
 at U
niversita Com
m
erciale Luigi Bocconi on Septem
ber 20, 2016
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
2. Input Specificity. The propagation of input shocks should be
stronger when the supplier is specific, and thus harder for the
firm to replace. We use our three measures of specificity to test
whether this is the case. We expect the coefficient on the dummy
Disaster hits one specific supplier to be positive, significant, and
larger than the dummy on the coefficient Disaster hits one
nonspecific supplier. The results are presented in Table VIII.
Overall, the effect is indeed much stronger when a disaster hits
a specific supplier rather than a nonspecific one. The effect of
nonspecific suppliers is generally insignificant, whereas the
effect of specific suppliers is greater than the baseline estimates.
Hence, the results suggest that input specificity is a key driver of
the propagation of shocks from suppliers to their customers.
TABLE VIII
DOWNSTREAM PROPAGATION—INPUT SPECIFICITY
Sales Growth (t – 4,t)
Supplier Specificity Diff. R&D Patent
Disaster hits one
nonspecific
supplier (t  4)
0.002 0.002 0.018 0.011 0.020* 0.016
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Disaster hits one
specific supplier
(t  4)
0.050*** 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.032** 0.039*** 0.034***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012)
Disaster hits firm
(t  4)
0.031*** 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.029***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Number of
suppliers
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size, age, ROA 
year-quarter FE
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 80,574 80,574 80,574 80,574 80,574 80,574
R2 0.234 0.262 0.234 0.261 0.234 0.262
Notes. This table presents estimates from panel regressions of firms’ sales growth relative to the same
quarter in the previous year on two dummies indicating whether (at least) one specific supplier and
whether (at least) one nonspecific supplier is hit by a major disaster in the same quarter of the previous
year. In the first and second columns, a supplier is considered as specific if its industry lies above the
median of the share of differentiated goods according to the classification provided by Rauch (1999). In the
third and fourth columns, a supplier is considered specific if its ratio of R&D expenses over sales is above
the median in the two years prior to any given quarter. In the fifth and sixth columns, a supplier is
considered as specific if the number of patents it issued in the previous three years is above the median.
All regressions include a dummy indicating whether the firm itself is hit by a major disaster in the same
quarter in the previous year as well as fiscal quarter, year-quarter, and firm fixed effects. All regressions
also control for the number of suppliers (dummies indicating terciles of the number of suppliers). In the
second, fourth, and sixth columns, we control for firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of
size, age, and ROA, respectively) interacted with year-quarter dummies. Regressions contain all firm-
quarters of our customer sample (described in Table II, Panel A) between 1978 and 2013. Standard
errors presented in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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3. Robustness. We perform a number of robustness tests and
present the results in the Online Appendix. We start with an
additional test of the parallel trend assumption, which consists
of estimating the difference-in-differences specification using
only observations of eventually treated firms. We show in Table
A.3 that our results are similar to those in Table V when we re-
strict the sample to eventually treated customer firms. One might
also be concerned that firms with many suppliers and firms with
few suppliers could be subject to differential trends. We augment
the baseline regression with dummies indicating terciles of the
number of firms’ suppliers interacted with year-quarter fixed ef-
fects and present the results in Table A.4. The estimates remain
stable, which indicates that the results are driven by the treat-
ment rather than the number of firms’ links.
We next check that our results are not driven by large natu-
ral disasters, which would affect customers in our sample
through their aggregate effect on the U.S. economy. To do so,
we first interact the dummy Disaster hits one supplier with the
variable Large nb of affected firms, which takes the value of 1 for
disasters that lie in the top half of the distribution of the total
number of directly affected Compustat firms. The results are re-
ported in columns (1) and (2) of Table A.5. The coefficient on the
interaction term is positive and insignificant, indicating that the
effect of input disruption does not vary with the importance of
disasters—if anything, it is smaller for more important ones. We
also look at whether the results differ for exporters and nonex-
porters. To do so, we interact the dummy Disaster hits one sup-
plier with the variable >50% sales abroad, which takes the value
of 1 if the customer firm reports sales abroad that represent more
than 50% of its total sales in the two years prior to any given
quarter. As shown in columns (3) and (4), we find that the effect
of the treatment is virtually the same for exporters and nonex-
porters, indicating again that the results are driven by input dis-
ruptions rather than demand effects due to natural disasters on
the U.S. economy.
We also check whether our results are not driven by large
natural disasters through their effect at the sector level. If sectors
tend to be clustered geographically so that all firms tend to be
affected by natural disasters, then the effects we are picking up
should be interpreted as sector-specific rather than firm-specific
shocks. In our sample, the average and median share of affected
sales at the four-digit SIC level are 19% and 8%, respectively.
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We interact the dummy Disaster hits one supplier with various
dummies for whether more than 10%, 30%, or 50% of the sup-
plier’s four-digit SIC sector is affected by the disaster. If what we
are picking up is the effect of disruptions to geographically clus-
tered sectors, the coefficient on the interaction term should in-
crease with the share of the sector being affected. We find in Table
A.6 that this is not the case.
We also check that our estimates are not sensitive to the
300-mile cutoff we use to exclude supplier-customers that are
geographically close. In Table A.7, we vary this cutoff from 0 to
500 miles and find that the results remain unchanged. We also
find results similar to the baseline in Table A.8, where we only
consider treatments when the customer and supplier are never
jointly hit by a disaster in the same quarter throughout the
sample period. In Table A.9, we also control for linkages across
firms via product- and input-market competition and find virtu-
ally identical estimates of the coefficient on our main variable of
interest, Disaster hits a supplier. We show in Table A.10 that the
coefficients go down slightly but remain significant when we
weight regressions by customers’ size (inflation-adjusted sales).
This ensures that the effects we are picking up are not concen-
trated among the smallest of the customers in our sample.
Finally, we confirm in Table A.11 that the estimates are robust
to an alternative definition of our main dependent variable,
namely, the difference in the logarithm of firm sales.
IV.C. Downstream Propagation: Effect on Customers’ Value
The drop in sales growth could simply reflect the fact that
sales are delayed, which would have few consequences for firms’
cash flows and value. However, the estimates in Table VI indicate
that firms’ sales growth does not overshoot in the quarters follow-
ing disasters, suggesting that these sales are lost indeed. We go
one step further and ask whether the disruption to specific sup-
pliers is reflected in firms’ stock returns. We follow standard
event study methodology and consider the first day when a
given major disaster hits a county in which a linked supplier’s
headquarters is located. Under the efficient market hypothesis,
the news of input disruption should be quickly reflected in the
firm share price, allowing us to compute the associated drop in
firm value.
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1. Returns Analysis. We select all firm-disaster pairs in our
sample satisfying the following requirements: (i) (at least) one sup-
plier of the firm is hit by the disaster, (ii) the firm is not hit by the
disaster, (iii) the firm and its suppliers are not hit by another major
disaster in the previous or following 30 trading days around the
event date, and (iv) the firm has no missing daily returns in the
estimation or event window. The event date is the day considered
as the beginning of the disaster in the SHELDUS database.27 We
find 1,082 events satisfying the above requirements. For each firm-
disaster pair, we then estimate daily abnormal stock returns using
the Fama-French three-factor model:
Ri;t ¼ i þ iRM;t þ si SMBt þ hi HMLt þ i;t;ð2Þ
where Ri,t is the daily return of firm i; RM,t is the daily return
of the market portfolio minus the risk-free rate; SMBt is the
daily return of a small-minus-big portfolio; and HMLt is the
daily return of a high-minus-low portfolio.28 The three-factor
model is estimated over the interval from 260 to 11 trading
days before the event date. We use the estimates of the model
^i ; ^i ; s^i ; h^i ; u^i to construct abnormal returns in the event
window as:
ARit ¼ Rit  ð^i þ ^iRM;t þ s^iSMBt þ h^iHMLtÞ:ð3Þ
We then aggregate daily abnormal stock returns by averaging
them over all firm-disaster pairs (N) and summing them over
the trading days of different event windows—½10;1; ½0;10;
½11;20; ½21;30; ½31;40, and ½10;40, where ½t0¼10;T¼40 is
a 51-trading-days window starting 10 trading days before the
event date—to obtain cumulative average abnormal returns
(CAAR). Formally,
CAAR ¼
XT
t¼t0
ð1
N
XN
i¼1
ARitÞ:
27. If the day reported as the beginning of the disaster in SHELDUS is a non-
trading day, we use the next trading day as the event date. If more than one supplier
is hit by the same disaster, the earliest beginning date in SHELDUS is considered
as the event date.
28. RM, SMB, and HML returns are obtained from Kenneth French’s website.
SMB and HML returns are meant to capture size and book-to-market effects,
respectively.
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We also examine whether the effect on firms’ stock returns differs
with the specificity of affected suppliers. To do so, we compute
firms’ cumulative abnormal returns separately for natural disas-
ters affecting or not (at least) one specific supplier.
Because natural disasters hit several firms at the same time,
this is likely to generate cross-sectional correlation in abnormal
returns across (indirectly affected) customer firms. To address this
issue, we test for statistical significance using the ADJ-BMP t-
statistic proposed by Kolari and Pynno¨nen (2010), which is a mod-
ified version of the standardized test developed in Boehmer,
Masumeci, and Poulsen (1991). Kolari and Pynno¨nen (2010)
show that the ADJ-BMP test accounts for cross-sectional correla-
tion in abnormal returns and is robust to serial correlation.29
2. Results. Table IX, illustrated in Figure V, reports cumula-
tive average abnormal returns over different event windows—as
well as their respective ADJ-BMP t-statistics—separately for
treated firms, their (directly affected) suppliers and untreated
firms, that is, for which all linked suppliers are not affected by
a given major disaster. CAAR for treated customer firms on the 51
trading days event window ½t0 ¼ 10;T ¼ 40 are negative and
statistically significant, indicating a drop of around 1% in the firm
stock price when one of its supplier(s) is hit by a major natural
disaster. A large fraction of this drop occurs in the 21 trading days
½t0 ¼ 10;T ¼ 10 around the event, for which CAAR are highly
statistically significant, which is consistent with investors
quickly reacting to the news.30 These findings indicate that
firms’ sales are not simply postponed in reaction to input disrup-
tions but materialize into sizable value losses.
We find that directly affected suppliers experience an abnor-
mal drop in returns of around 2.5% over the same event window.
In the third column of Table IX, we consider the average stock
price reaction of untreated customers. Reassuringly, the size of
the effect is small in all event windows for these firms.
29. Note also that simulations presented in Kolari and Pynno¨nen (2010) sug-
gest that the ADJ-BMP test is superior in terms of power to the commonly used
portfolio approach to account for serial correlation.
30. Earthquakes’ striking dates might be considered truly unexpected events.
However, in the case of hurricanes, for instance, stock price valuation might incor-
porate forecasts about the passage and severity of the hurricane in the few days
prior to the striking date.
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Finally, Table X presents the results separately for events
affecting specific and nonspecific suppliers. For our three mea-
sures of input specificity, we find that firms experience a larger
drop in returns when disasters hit their specific suppliers than
their nonspecific ones.
Overall, these findings indicate that stock prices react to sup-
plier risk, especially when linked suppliers are specific. These
findings provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first cleanly
identified evidence that input disruptions have an effect on firm
value, and that input specificity is a key determinant thereof.
IV.D. Horizontal Propagation: Effect on Related Suppliers
Here we explore whether the effects documented above spill
over to other related suppliers that are not directly affected by the
natural disaster but only indirectly through their common
TABLE IX
DOWNSTREAM PROPAGATION—EFFECT ON FIRM VALUE
CAAR
Customers Suppliers Customers
(Direct Effect) (Control Group)
(N ¼ 1,082) (N ¼ 2,004) (N ¼ 6,379)
[10,1] 0.487 0.195 0.176**
(1.283) (0.819) (2.310)
[0,10] 0.361* 0.548** 0.124
(1.911) (2.215) (0.302)
[11,20] 0.177 1.452*** 0.029
(0.269) (3.340) (0.205)
[21,30] 0.121 0.385 0.006
(0.583) (1.088) (0.392)
[31,40] 0.014 0.120 0.042
(0.215) (1.123) (1.208)
[10,40] 1.132** 2.459*** 0.379
(1.982) (3.029) (1.563)
Notes. This table presents CAAR of customer firms around the first day of a natural disaster affecting
(at least) one of its suppliers. When more than one supplier is affected by the same natural disaster, the
event day is the earliest date across affected suppliers reported in SHELDUS database. Abnormal returns
are computed after estimating, for each firm-disaster pair, a three-factor Fama-French model over the
interval from 260 to 11 trading days before the event date. We exclude firm-disaster observations with
missing returns in the estimation or event windows, when the firm itself is hit by the disaster, or when
the firm or one of its suppliers are hit by another major disaster in the 30 trading days around the event.
ADJ-BMP t-statistics, presented in parentheses, are computed with the standardized cross-sectional
method of Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen (1991) and adjusted for cross-sectional correlation as in
Kolari and Pynno¨nen (2010). The second column reports CAAR of directly hit supplier firms. The third
column reports CAAR of unaffected customer firms, namely, firm-disaster pairs for which no suppliers
reporting the firm as a customer have been hit by the disaster. Computations of abnormal returns follow
the same procedure as above. The sample period is from 1978 to 2013. *, **, and *** denote significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
INPUT SPECIFICITY AND IDIOSYNCRATIC SHOCKS 35
 at U
niversita Com
m
erciale Luigi Bocconi on Septem
ber 20, 2016
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
relationship with the same customer.31 Going back to the setting
described in Section II, we are interested in the response of S2 to
the drop in C’s sales triggered by a disruption to S1’s production.
FIGURE V
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns
This figure presents cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of customer
firms around the first day of a natural disaster affecting (at least) one of its sup-
pliers. When more than one supplier is affected by the same natural disaster, the
event day is the earliest date across affected suppliers reported in SHELDUS
database. Abnormal returns are computed after estimating, for each firm-disaster
pair, a three-factor Fama-French model over the interval from 260 to 11 trading
days before the event date. Firm-disaster observations with missing returns in the
estimation or event windows, for which the firm itself is hit by the disaster or for
which the firm or one of its suppliers are hit by another major disaster in the
previous or following 30 trading days on either side of the event date are excluded.
We find 1,082 customer firm-disaster pairs satisfying these requirements.
31. The nature of our data limits our ability to precisely estimate the effect of
disruptions on customers’ customers: there are only 0.12% of the observations in
our sample for which the dummyDisasters hits a supplier’s supplier takes the value
1. The alternative network structure we obtain from Capital IQ (see Section A.3 in
the Online Appendix) is not subject to this limitation. In that case, there are 9.9% of
the observations for which the dummyDisasters hits a supplier’s supplier takes the
value 1. In Table A.19, we runthis analysis and find that the effect on salesgrowth of
disruptions affecting a firm’s suppliers’ supplier is negative but insignificant.
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Note that the direction of the effect is unclear. It could be
positive or negative, depending on the degree of complementarity
across intermediate input suppliers. If intermediate inputs are
strong substitutes, the response might be positive, that is, the
disruption of supplier leads to an increase in sales growth of
other suppliers servicing the same customer. Conversely, when
they are complement, related suppliers could experience a de-
crease in sales, in particular if they cannot easily shift their pro-
duction to other customers. To estimate the direction of the effect,
we run the OLS specification presented in Section II in the
sample of suppliers.
The results are presented in Table XI. In the first column, the
coefficient on Disaster hits one customer’s supplier is a negative
and significant 3.8 percentage point decrease in sales growth.
TABLE X
DOWNSTREAM PROPAGATION—INPUT SPECIFICITY AND EFFECT ON FIRM VALUE
Customers’ CAAR When Disaster
Hits at Least One Supplier
Supplier Specificity Diff. R&D Patent
N ¼ 628 N ¼ 454 N ¼ 318 N ¼ 764 N ¼ 375 N ¼ 707
At least one
specific supplier Yes No Yes No Yes No
[10,1] 0.885 0.064 0.321 0.556 0.096 0.694*
(1.567) (0.288) (0.568) (1.243) (0.164) (1.731)
[0,10] 0.636*** 0.018 0.621 0.253 0.651*** 0.208
(2.757) (0.022) (1.395) (1.542) (2.585) (0.742)
[11,20] 0.168 0.189 0.181 0.326 0.177 0.365
(0.608) (0.250) (1.482) (1.021) (0.479) (0.674)
[21,30] 0.460 0.348 1.351** 0.391 0.560 0.112
(1.017) (0.192) (2.349) (0.564) (0.502) (0.421)
[31,40] 0.219 0.337 0.340 0.162 0.391 0.229
(0.331) (0.006) (0.896) (0.213) (0.381) (0.038)
[10,40] 2.368*** 0.578 2.452* 0.582 1.519 0.926*
(2.939) (0.080) (1.769) (1.412) (1.285) (1.690)
Notes. This table presents CAAR of customer firms separately for events affecting (at least one)
specific supplier or only nonspecific suppliers. In the first column, a supplier is considered as specific if
its industry lies above the median of the share of differentiated goods according to the classification
provided by Rauch (1999). In the third column, a supplier is considered specific if the ratio of its R&D
expenses over sales is above the median in the two years prior to any given quarter. In the fifth column, a
supplier is considered as specific if the number of patents it issued in the previous three years is above the
median. Abnormal returns are computed after estimating, for each firm-disaster pair, a three-factor Fama-
French model over the interval from 260 to 11 trading days before the event date. Firm-disaster obser-
vations with missing returns in the estimation or event windows, for which the firm itself is hit by the
disaster, or for which the firm or one of its suppliers are hit by another major disaster in the previous or
following 30 trading days on either side of the event date are excluded. ADJ-BMP t-statistics, presented in
parentheses, are computed with the standardized cross-sectional method of Boehmer, Masumeci, and
Poulsen (1991) and adjusted for cross-sectional correlation as in Kolari and Pynno¨nen (2010). The
sample period is from 1978 to 2013. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
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This is consistent with substantial negative spillovers to related
suppliers. In line with Table III, the coefficient on Disaster hits
firm (t 4,t  1) is also negative and significant. Results pre-
sented in the second through fourth columns are obtained by
augmenting the model with a dummy, Disaster hits one cus-
tomer’s specific supplier, which isolates the effect of disruptions
to specific suppliers of the customer. The estimates indicate that
most of the negative effect feeding back from the customer comes
from initial shocks to specific suppliers (either differentiated,
R&D-intensive, or patent-intensive). These results uncover an
important channel through which firm-specific shocks propagate
horizontally, across suppliers of a given firm.
TABLE XI
HORIZONTAL PROPAGATION—RELATED SUPPLIERS’ SALES GROWTH
Sales Growth (t  4,t)
Supplier Specificity Diff. R&D Patent
Disaster hits firm (t  4,t  1) 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.040***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Disaster hits one customer
(t  4,t  1)
0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Disaster hits one customer’s
supplier (t  4,t  1)
0.038***
(0.010)
Disaster hits one customer’s
specific supplier (t  4,t  1)
0.047*** 0.048*** 0.040***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Disaster hits one customer’s
non-specific supplier
(t  4,t  1)
0.011 0.013 0.015
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Number of customers’ Suppliers Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size, age, ROA 
year-quarter FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 139,976 139,976 139,976 139,976
R2 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192
Notes. This table presents estimated coefficients from panel regressions of firms’ sales growth relative
to the same quarter in the previous year on one dummy indicating whether one of the firm’s customers’
other suppliers is hit by a major disaster in the previous four quarters. The second and fourth columns
split customers’ other suppliers into specific and nonspecific suppliers. All regressions include two dum-
mies indicating whether the firm itself is hit in the previous four quarters and whether one of the firm’s
customer is hit in the previous four quarters. All regressions also control for the number of customers’
suppliers (dummies indicating terciles of the number of customers’ suppliers). All regressions include fiscal
quarter, year-quarter, and firm fixed effects as well as firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating
terciles of size, age, and ROA, respectively) interacted with year-quarter dummies. Standard errors pre-
sented in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. Regressions contain all firm-quarters of our supplier
sample (described in Table II, Panel B) between 1978 and 2013. *, **, and *** denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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These effects may be driven by the fact that some establish-
ments of S2 are located close to S1. To address this concern, we
introduce a dummy equal to 1 if at least 10% of S2’s workforce is
hit by the disaster. If the effect that we are measuring in Table XI
is due to the fact that the link between S1 and S2 proxies for the
location of S2’s plants, then this variable should absorb the effects
of our main treatment variable. In Table XII, Panel A, the intro-
duction of this dummy does not affect the coefficient on Disaster
hits one customer’s supplier.
Another concern might be that these results are driven by
unobserved economic links between S1 and S2, not related to
their common relationship with C. The fact that S2’s sales
growth is affected when S1 is hit by a natural disaster could be
the consequence of the fact that S2’s demand is located close to
the headquarters of S1 and is therefore affected by the disaster.
In Table XII, Panel B, we augment the model with a dummy
called Disaster hits any customers’ eventually linked suppliers’
location, which takes the value of 1 if for any customer of S1, at
least one of all the locations of all suppliers once in a relationship
with this customer is hit by a natural disaster. If the effects that
we are picking up in Table XI reflect the geographical clustering
of the demand to suppliers of C, this variable should subsume the
main variable of interest. However, we find that the results are
robust to the introduction of this variable.
Finally, we check that the effect on S2 is not driven by a
common industry shock affecting both S1 and S2 by introducing
a dummy called Disaster hits any eventually linked customer’s sup-
pliers taking the value of 1 whenever C is affected by a shock to S1,
irrespective of whether there is an active business relationship
between C and S2. If the effects found on S2 are related to
common shocks to S1 and S2, the inclusion of this variable
should absorb the effect of the variableDisaster hits one customer’s
supplier. However, in Table XII, Panel C, the coefficients are robust
to the introduction of this variable. In addition, the coefficient on
this variable is not different from 0, which indicates that the initial
shock would not spill over to related suppliers in the absence of an
active economic link through their common customer.
IV.E. Discussion
1. A General Equilibrium Network Model. To check whether
our estimates fall within a reasonable range, we present a general
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TABLE XII
HORIZONTAL PROPAGATION—ROBUSTNESS
Supplier’s Sales Growth (t – 4,t)
Diff. R&D Patent
Panel A: Controlling for share of the workforce hit
Disaster hits at least 10% of firm’s
workforce (t  4,t  1)
0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Disaster hits firm (t  4,t  1) 0.035* 0.035** 0.035* 0.035**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Disaster hits one customer (t  4,t  1) 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Disaster hits one customer’s supplier
(t  4,t  1)
0.038***
(0.010)
Disaster hits one customer’s specific
supplier (t  4,t  1)
0.047*** 0.048*** 0.040***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Disaster hits one customer’s
nonspecific supplier (t  4,t  1)
0.011 0.013 0.015
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Observations 139,976 139,976 139,976 139,976
R2 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192
Panel B: Controlling for whether any customers’ ‘‘eventually linked supplier’’ is hit
Disaster hits any customers’ eventually
linked suppliers’ location (t  4,t  1)
0.022* 0.022* 0.022 0.022*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Disaster hits firm (t  4,t  1) 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Disaster hits one customer (t  4,t  1) 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Disaster hits one customer’s supplier
(t  4,t  1)
0.038***
(0.010)
Disaster hits one customer’s specific
supplier (t  4,t  1)
0.047*** 0.048*** 0.039***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Disaster hits one customer’s
nonspecific supplier (t  4,t  1)
0.011 0.013 0.015
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Observations 139,976 139,976 139,976 139,976
R2 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192
Panel C: Controlling for whether any ‘‘eventually linked customers’ ’’ supplier is hit
Disaster hits any eventually linked
customer’s supplier (t  4,t  1)
0.008 0.005 0.019 0.012
(0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014)
Disaster hits firm (t  4,t  1) 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.039***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Disaster hits one customer (t  4,t  1) 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Disaster hits one customer’s supplier
(t  4,t  1)
0.032*
(0.016)
Disaster hits one customer’s specific
supplier (t  4,t  1)
0.044*** 0.041*** 0.036***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.013)
Disaster hits one customer’s
nonspecific supplier (t  4,t  1)
0.008 0.003 0.008
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Observations 139,976 139,976 139,976 139,976
R2 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192
Number of customers’ suppliers Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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equilibrium network model based on Long and Plosser (1983) and
Acemoglu et al. (2012) in Section A.1 of the Online Appendix that
delivers predictions of the magnitude of the pass-through of sup-
pliers’ disruptions to their customers (vertical propagation) and
the other suppliers of their customers (horizontal propagation).32
Firms have constant-returns-to-scale production functions and
choose the quantities of labor and intermediate inputs to maxi-
mize profits, while households provide labor and consume. We
model the effect of natural disasters as the destruction of a
small fraction of the output of impacted firms. We express the
pass-through of supply disruptions to any given firm as the
ratio of its sales drop to the disrupted supplier’s sales drop as a
function of model parameters. In Online Appendix A.1B we pre-
sent and discuss the predicted value of the downstream and hor-
izontal pass-throughs and the ratio of both pass-throughs, as a
function of , the elasticity of substitution across intermediate
TABLE XII
CONTINUED
Supplier’s Sales Growth (t – 4,t)
Diff. R&D Patent
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size, age, ROA  year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 139,976 139,976 139,976 139,976
R2 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192
Notes. This table presents estimated coefficients from panel regressions of firms’ sales growth relative
to the same quarter in the previous year on one dummy indicating whether one of the firm’s customers’
other suppliers is hit by a major disaster in the four previous quarters, as well as in Panel A a dummy
indicating whether 10% or more of the firm’s workforce is hit by a major disaster in the four previous
quarters, in Panel B a dummy indicating whether (at least) one location of any other suppliers once in a
relationship with a customer of the firm is hit by a major disaster in the four previous quarters, in Panel C
a dummy indicating whether (at least) one other supplier of any customer once in a relationship with the
firm is hit by a major disaster in the four previous quarters. The second through fourth columns split
customers’ other suppliers into specific and nonspecific suppliers. All regressions include two dummies
indicating whether the firm itself is hit in the previous four quarters and whether one of the firm’s
customer is hit in the previous four quarters. All regressions also control for the number of customers’
suppliers (dummies indicating terciles of the number of customers’ suppliers). All regressions include fiscal
quarter, year-quarter, and firm fixed effects as well as firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating
terciles of size, age, and ROA, respectively) interacted with year-quarter dummies. Standard errors pre-
sented in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. Regressions contain all firm-quarters of our supplier
sample (described in Table II, Panel B) between 1978 and 2013. *, **, and *** denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
32. Within our framework, horizontal propagation combines the effect of the
demand feedback effect from the common customer and the effect of complemen-
tarity across suppliers of intermediate inputs. See Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2008) for a framework that allows for a clear decomposition of both channels.
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input suppliers.33 We compare these pass-throughs to the ratio of
the estimates we obtain from Table VI and XI, namely, a down-
stream pass-through close to 2%4% ¼ 0:5, a horizontal pass-through
close to 3:8%4% ¼ 0:95, and a ratio of the horizontal over downstream
pass-through of 0:950:5 ¼ 1:9. Our empirical estimates are compara-
ble, yet slightly higher, to the predictions of the model for values
of  nearing 0, the Leontief limit, which are 0.3, 0.5, and 1.5,
respectively. Our reduced-form coefficients are therefore consis-
tent with the predictions of a network model with high levels of
complementarity across intermediate input suppliers.
2. Sample Representativeness. An important concern with the
network production data used in this article is that it includes
relationships wherein the customer typically represents more
than 10% of the sales of the supplier and both firms are publicly
listed. Even though the firms we consider are the largest in the
economy, this double selection issue might introduce some bias in
our estimates. A priori, the fact that we are missing some suppli-
ers introduces noise, which is likely to bias the results against
finding any sort of propagation.34 Nonetheless, in Section A.3 of
the Online Appendix, we go one step further to ensure that this
selection issue is not driving the results. We replicate our results
using an alternative network structure that is not prone to the
selection issues highlighted above. We consider an alternative
firm-level data set obtained from Capital IQ, which provides
firm-to-firm relationships based on regulatory filings as well as
press reports and is therefore not subject to the 10% reporting
threshold. Reassuringly, we find similar estimates when we run
our baseline tests using this network data (see columns (1) and (2)
of Online Appendix Table A.17). We also show that downstream
propagation does not depend on whether the supplier is publicly
listed and that horizontal propagation does not depend on
33. We set the share of intermediate inputs to 0.55, the elasticity of substitution
between labor and intermediate inputs to 1, and the cross-firm elasticity of demand
to 2. See Online Appendix A.1B for discussions of parameter values and of the
sensitivity of model predictions to these values.
34. Moreover, Atalay et al. (2011) use these data and show that the truncation
issue does not affect the shape of the in-degree distribution: the fraction of suppliers
of each customer that we miss because of the 10% threshold is similar for customers
with many or few suppliers.
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whether the customer is publicly listed (see columns (3) and (4) of
Table A.17). A limitation of our study is that we cannot observe
the output growth of privately held firms. Reassuringly, we find
similar estimates when we consider the effect of supply disrup-
tions at the industry level (Online Appendix Table A.20) or at the
industry  state level (Online Appendix Table A.21).
3. Measurement of Output. The benefit of using Compustat
data is that they allow us to measure sales growth at the quar-
terly frequency. Although we cannot disentangle quantity from
prices from Compustat data, we also find significant effects of
intermediate input disruptions on real output growth when we
perform our analyses at the industry level (Online Appendix
Table A.20). A related concern is that we cannot measure value
added from Compustat. Hence, we cannot disentangle from the
drop in sales what comes from the drop in value added and what
comes from the drop in intermediate input use. The finding that
state  industry GDP growth reacts to intermediate input dis-
ruptions (Online Appendix Table A.21) suggests that supply
shocks ultimately reduce downstream value added.35
4. Role of Inventories. Inventories typically serve as a buffer
for production. One might expect differential patterns of propa-
gation depending on whether firms hold high or low inventories.
We first ask whether suppliers holding high levels of inventories
tend to experience the drop in sales growth later than those hold-
ing little inventories. In Table A.13 in the Online Appendix, we
find that high inventory suppliers experience their largest drop in
sales growth in quarter (t  2), one quarter later than low inven-
tory suppliers who experience it in quarter (t  1). We then turn
to regressions at the customer level. Given what we found at the
supplier level, we would expect the effect to kick in later for cus-
tomers sourcing from high inventory suppliers. In Online
Appendix Table A.14, we split the Disaster hits supplier dummy
35. In addition, we find in Table A.16 in the Online Appendix that the ratio of
sales to capital and labor goes down following intermediate input disruptions.
Hence, in contrast to Costinot, Vogel, and Wang (2013) who assume that down-
stream errors (or disasters) are more costly because they destroy a longer chain of
value added, our results suggest that upstream errors are more costly because they
prohibit downstream tasks from being performed. We thank an anonymous referee
for highlighting this point.
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into two dummies indicating whether a disaster hits a high or low
inventory supplier. We find that the drop in sales growth occurs
in quarters (t 3) and (t 4) when a low-inventory supplier is hit,
whereas it occurs in quarters (t  4) and (t  5) when a high-
inventory supplier is hit. This illustrates that inventories delay
the propagation of supply shocks in production networks.
5. Economic Significance. We first note that treated firms in
our sample make up a large share of the U.S. economy. In any
given quarter, eventually treated firms represent 36% and 43% of
total Compustat sales and total stock market value, respectively.
In quarters when natural disasters hit the U.S. territory, treated
firms represent on average 9% of total Compustat sales and total
stock market value, which is economically significant. By con-
trast, eventually hit suppliers represent 12% and 15% of total
Compustat sales and stock market value, respectively, in an av-
erage quarter, and affected suppliers represent on average 1% of
total Compustat sales and total stock market value in quarters
when a disaster hits. Another way to assess the economic impor-
tance of propagation is to compare the aggregate output losses for
suppliers and customers in our sample. To compute this multi-
plier, we first estimate the lost sales for each firm in the sample
due to direct or indirect exposure to natural disasters. The drop in
sales growth is obtained for each firm by taking the residual of a
regression of sales growth on fiscal quarter, year-quarter, and
firm fixed effects, as well as controls for size, age, and return on
assets interacted with year-quarter dummies in the four quarters
following any disaster. We then apply these sales growth resid-
uals to the 2013 constant dollar value of firms’ sales to obtain the
dollar value of lost sales. We aggregate these lost sales across
suppliers and customers in our sample. We find that lost sales
amount to approximately $246 billion for suppliers and $580 bil-
lion for customers. Hence, $1 of lost sales at the supplier level
leads to $2.4 of lost sales at the customer level in our sample. This
suggests that relationships in production networks substantially
amplify idiosyncratic shocks. Whether or not this amplification
mechanism is powerful enough to generate fluctuations in aggre-
gate output is a question that we leave to future research.
6. Trends in Input Specificity. Figure VI draws from Nunn
(2007) to quantify the importance of input specificity. The
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author uses the U.S. input-output table to identify which inter-
mediate inputs are used and in what proportions in the produc-
tion of each final good. Then, using data from Rauch (1999),
inputs are sorted into those sold on an organized exchange,
those reference priced in a trade publication, and those that are
differentiated. As evidenced from the graph, the share of differ-
entiated inputs is large and increasing. Hence, the propagation
channel examined in this article is likely to play an important and
growing role for the aggregation of idiosyncratic shocks in pro-
duction networks.
7. External Validity. Our results are informative for these
kinds of idiosyncratic shocks and their propagation in the econ-
omy. Nonetheless, these results can plausibly be extended to
other forms of firm-specific idiosyncratic shocks, such as strikes
0
20%
40%
60%
1982 1987 1992 1997
Share of total inputs
Sold on organized exchange Reference priced Differentiated
FIGURE VI
Aggregate Input Specificity in the United States
This figure is based on the computation of Nunn (2007). The author uses
the U.S. Input-Output Use Table to identify which intermediate inputs are used
and in what proportions, in the production of each final good. Then, using data
from Rauch (1999), inputs are sorted into those sold on an organized exchange,
those that are reference priced in a trade publication, and those that are
differentiated.
INPUT SPECIFICITY AND IDIOSYNCRATIC SHOCKS 45
 at U
niversita Com
m
erciale Luigi Bocconi on Septem
ber 20, 2016
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
or management turnover.36 In addition, the results presented in
this article also extend to the specificity of inputs within the
boundaries of the firm. While the customer-supplier links allow
us to pin down the nature of the input, we would expect similar
results to be obtained within a firm, when the division producing
a specific part of the final good is hit by a shock. Yet the extrap-
olation of the results should take into account that firms endog-
enously select their location and the location of their suppliers.
This does not threaten our identification strategy and should bias
the results against finding any propagation effects. In fact, we
show in Table A.15 in the Online Appendix that propagation
tends to be weaker when disasters hit areas that are frequently
hit in our sample. Although this is a nice confirmation that pro-
duction networks react more strongly to shocks that are less
likely to be anticipated, it also suggests that one should be cau-
tious in extrapolating our findings to estimate the impact of
larger shocks, if firms devote more resources to shelter them-
selves against those than against natural disasters.
V. Conclusion
This article explores whether firm-level shocks propagate in
production networks. Using supplier-customer links reported by
U.S. publicly listed firms, we find that customers of suppliers hit
by a natural disaster experience a drop of 2–3 percentage points
in sales growth following the event, which amounts to a 25% drop
with respect to the sample average. Given the relative size of
suppliers and customers in our sample, this estimate is strikingly
large. The effect is temporary, shows no prior trends, and is only
observed when the relationship between customers and suppliers
is active. It is significantly stronger when the affected supplier
produces differentiated goods, has a high level of R&D, or owns
patents and is thus plausibly more difficult to replace. Sales
losses translate into significant value losses to the order 1% of
market equity value. Finally, the effect spills over to other sup-
pliers, who also experience a drop in sales growth following the
disaster.
36. For narrative examples of the role of strikes at the largest U.S. firms in
explaining GDP fluctuations, see Gabaix (2011).
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We provide evidence that on average, specific input disrup-
tions do not seem to be compensated and translate into sector-
wide output losses. Given that a large share of firms’ inputs in the
United States are specific, the amplification mechanism that we
describe is likely to be pervasive. Taken together, these findings
suggest that input specificity is a key determinant of the propa-
gation of idiosyncratic shocks in the economy.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and CEPR
Bocconi University and IGIER
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An Online Appendix for this article can be found at QJE
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